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SEEING IS BELIEVING:1 
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
DEMONSTRATIVE COMPUTER EVIDENCE 
“If we leap off the technological cliff without looking, we shouldn’t 
be surprised by an occasional splat.”2 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The expert raised his right hand, affirmed his oath to tell the truth and nothing but 
the truth, and took his place in the witness box.4 Sitting, he took a deep breath, 
                                                                
1Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 4, 1994).  The court recited this adage in concluding that the jury might give undue 
weight to a computer simulation. 
2Fredric Lederer, Is Technology Changing Civil Justice?, TRIAL, March 1998, at 40, 42.  
Professor Lederer is Chancellor Professor of Law at William and Mary Law School in 
Williamsburg, Virginia.  Id. at 40.  He is also the director of the Courtroom 21 Project, which 
provides both a demonstration center for state-of-the art courtroom technology and a research 
center that examines the impact of technology on the justice system.  Id. 
3A.S. in Computer Technology, Kent State University; B.A. in Management, Malone 
College; J.D., University of Akron School of Law. Previously to attending law school, Ms. 
Butera was a data processing professional for over 16 years.  Ms. Butera is currently an 
associate with Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs in Canton, Ohio.  The author would like to 
thank her family, friends, and children for their support during her efforts to complete this 
project. 
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knowing the questions were about to begin.  The prosecutor began questioning the 
expert regarding the disaster.  The expert answered the questions patiently, 
methodically, calmly.  Yes, the boat was at sea.  Yes, the night was dark.  Yes, 
lookout was made, but the lookout failed to perceive the danger.  Yes, the boat ran 
into the unidentified object, and sustained damage.  Yes, due to the complex laws of 
both physics and physiology, the normal human eye would have been unable to spot 
the danger in time to avoid it.  Yes, many people died in the aftermath.  No, based 
upon my knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education, my opinion to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty is that the accident was caused by the forces 
of nature coupled with simple carelessness. 
The expert looked at the jury box.  It had been a long, drawn-out trial, as criminal 
trials of this type usually are.  The jury looked tired, dazed and sleepy.  The expert 
knew his testimony was important to this case, and wondered what he could do to 
convey to the nodding jury the impact of the events as they actually occurred. 
This may be fiction, but the above scenario may be probable today in a trial to 
determine criminal liability for a Titanic-type disaster.5  Ah, yes, the Titanic . . . the 
name alone imparts to the reader the scale and depth of the victims’ misery and 
death.6  Yet, the words this expert may have spoken, even though quite factual, 
barely convey to the reader and the fictitious jury the depth and extent of the actual 
events.  Imagine in this same fictional trial if the expert could have used computer 
simulations to demonstrate his testimony.  The reasonableness and coincidental 
nature of the actual events would have been visualized within the minds of the jury.7 
With the invention of television and the development of computerization our 
society and our juries have become much more visually oriented.8  As computer 
equipment itself becomes more financially accessible, more experts are using 
computer simulations as demonstrative evidence during their trial testimony.  
However, this use of computer simulations presents several novel, complex issues.  
Which evidence rules are applicable during expert testimony accompanied by 
demonstrative computer simulation?  Are our experts, attorneys and/or judges 
sufficiently knowledgeable to effectively handle this demonstrative evidence?  Is the 
use of demonstrative computer simulations unduly influential to the jury and 
                                                          
4The story of the trial is fictional, and used for illustrative purposes only. 
5The Titanic was the largest and most expensive passenger ship built during its time.  Jim 
Sadur, Titanic: Facts & Figures, (March 27, 1998) <http://www.intercall.net/ 
~jsadur/titanic/facts.html>.  It was built to be unsinkable.  Id.  However, on her maiden voyage 
two days out of port, the liner hit an iceberg and within a few hours completely sank.  Id. 
6The Titanic held 2,228 people on board, but only had lifeboat capacity for 1,178 people.  
Id.  It sank in 12,500 feet of water, approximately 375 miles southeast of Newfoundland.  
Approximately 1,523 perished in the tragedy, most from exposure.  Id.  
7Adam T. Berkoff, Computer Simulations in Litigation: Are Television Generation Jurors 
Being Misled?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 829, 829 (1994).  Once the jurors see the simulation, “the 
images will be graven on their minds.”  Id. 
8Id.  See also THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 139 (4th ed. 1996).  “A whole 
generation of Americans has been raised and educated primarily by seeing.  Children learn by 
watching TV . . . .”  Id. For a practical discussion of the use of computer technology to prepare 
for trial, see William S. Bailey, Using Computer Technology to Prepare For Trial, TRIAL, 
Apr. 1998, at 44. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss3/7
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prejudicial to the opposing party?  Is there a backlash against the over-use of 
technology by segments of our society? 
These and many other issues are considered, resulting in this practical tool to be 
used in admitting demonstrative computer evidence.  Part II will explore the 
backgrounds of demonstrative evidence, computerization, and the use of computer 
simulation for demonstrative evidence.9  Part III will discuss and analyze several 
relevant issues, including attorney training, expert knowledge, judicial confusion, 
additional evidentiary issues, and the possible prejudicial influence of demonstrative 
computer simulations.10  This discussion concludes with some general thoughts 
regarding the use of demonstrative computer simulation to illustrate expert 
testimony.11 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  General Background of Demonstrative Evidence 
Information which is presented to us is absorbed by us primarily through sight.12  
Research shows that the use of visual aids to assist with an oral presentation can 
facilitate comprehension, increase understanding and retention levels by as much as 
sixty-five percent.13  Additionally, information which is perceived by the individual 
from a variety of methods (aural, visual, and written) is retained and understood at a 
substantially higher level.14 
Demonstrative evidence uses models, charts, diagrams or actual demonstrations 
to clarify or explain other relevant, substantive evidence introduced at trial.15  
Demonstrative evidence has been included in the American trial process for well 
                                                                
9See infra Part II.A-B. 
10See infra Part III.A-E. 
11See infra Part IV. 
12Fred H. Cate & Newton N. Minow, Communicating with Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1101, 1114 
(1993). 
13Id. “[A] witness’s oral testimony can be absolutely boring and by this time a juror has 
stopped paying full attention.  It should come as no surprise that as much as ninety percent of 
verbal testimony is misunderstood or forgotten completely.”  Id., quoting Theodore D. 
Ciccone, President of Litigation Communications, Inc. 
14See also MAUET, supra note 8, at 139.  “A study entitled the ‘Weiss-McGrath Report’ 
found a 100 percent increase in juror retention of visual over oral presentations and a 650 
percent increase in juror retention of combined visual and oral presentations over oral 
presentations alone.”  Mary C. Kelly & Jack N. Bernstein, Virtual Reality: The Reality of 
Getting It Admitted, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 145, n.39 (1994), quoting Roy 
Krieger, Now Showing at a Courtroom Near You . . .; Sophisticated Computer Graphics Come 
of Age - and Evidence Will Never Be the Same, ABA J., Dec. 1992, at 93. 
15Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance of Demonstrative 
Evidence: Charting its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 959 (1992).  
Mueller and Kirkpatrick have determined three different definitions for demonstrative 
evidence: 1) anything that appeals to the senses, 2) firsthand sense impression, and 3) 
illustrative evidence.  CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 1179-
80 (1995). 
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over 100 years.16  However, it was during the 1950’s, that trial attorneys like Melvin 
Belli “championed vivid, dramatic models or charts to persuade jurors.”17  Since that 
time, an increasing number of both civil and criminal trials have contained the use of 
demonstrative evidence.18 
Unlike substantive evidence, demonstrative evidence can only illustrate or 
explain other testimonial, documentary or real evidence.19  It cannot independently 
prove a fact and is usually prepared uniquely for litigation.20  Demonstrative 
evidence may be formally admitted21 and included in the record on appeal.22  During 
deliberations, the jury is usually permitted access only to exhibits formally admitted 
into evidence.23 
The foundational requirements for admissibility of evidence differ based upon 
jurisdictions.  The focus of this discussion is based upon the application of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  However, many states, including Ohio, have based their 
own state rules upon the Federal Rules, and many of the considerations and 
arguments found in this practical guide can be adopted for use in other jurisdictions.  
Additionally, as demonstrative computer evidence is an emerging issue for trial 
practitioners, all practitioners, regardless of jurisdictional rules, can glean insight 
from discussions contained in this guide. 
The foundational requirements for admissibility of demonstrative evidence are 
different from those requirements for substantive evidence.24  The foundational 
requirements focus on whether the demonstrative evidence can accurately and 
helpfully explain the other related evidence.25  To establish a foundation for 
admission of demonstrative evidence, the following requirements must be met: 
                                                                
16Brain & Broderick, supra note 15, at 959. 
17Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, Demonstrative Evidence: The Next Generation, 
17 No. 4 LITIGATION 21 (1991).  Belli threw a prosthetic leg at a jury in 1946, and told each 
juror to “feel the warm blood coursing through the veins.”  Brain & Broderick, supra note 15, 
at 998.  See also Melvin Belli, Demonstrative Evidence: Seeing is Believing, TRIAL, July 1980, 
at 70.  
18Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 21.  
19Id.  
20Brain & Broderick, supra note 15, at 971. 
21MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 1183. 
22Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 23. 
23United States v. Abbas, 504 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cox, 633 
F.2d 871, 874 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 430-32 (5th 
Cir. 1985).  But see United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316,1329 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314, 320-21 (10th Cir. 1974).   
24Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 23.  Substantive evidence may be admitted if it 
tends to prove the apparent existence or nonexistence of a relevant fact, therefore being 
primary relevance.  FED. R. EVID. 401.  See generally, George F. James, Relevancy, 
Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941). 
25Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 23. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss3/7
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1. The demonstrative exhibit relates to other relevant, competent, and 
material  testimonial, documentary, or real evidence;26 
2. The witness whose testimony the demonstrative exhibit illustrates is 
familiar with the exhibit;27 
3. The demonstrative evidence fairly and accurately reflects the other 
evidence to which it relates;28 and 
4. The demonstrative evidence will aid the trier of fact in understanding 
or evaluating the other related evidence.29 
Additionally, demonstrative evidence must still meet the general evidentiary rules 
which apply to all evidence.30 
B.  General Background of Demonstrative Computer Simulation  
The federal government lead the way into the computer age.31  During World 
War II, the Army funded development of a computer to calculate artillery 
trajectories.32  Following the Army’s construction of ENIAC, advances and use of 
computerization began to rapidly evolve, with several new machines being built.33 
In 1947, physicists at Bell Laboratories invented transistors, which performed the 
functions of vacuum tubes.34  The transistors were smaller, reliable and consumed 
much less power than vacuum tubes.35  In the late 1960’s and 1970’s, the next 
advances in computer technology arrived.36  Silicon computer chips replaced 
                                                                
26FED. R. EVID. 401; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 1181.  See generally 
Elwyn L. Cady, Jr., Objections to Demonstrative Evidence, 32 MO. L. REV. 333 (1967); Craig 
Spangenberg, The Use of Demonstrative Evidence, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 178 (1960).  
27FED. R. EVID. 602, 703; Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 24. 
28FED. R. EVID. 401; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 1182.  James 
McElhaney describes the phrase “fair and accurate” as “magic words” in the introduction of 
demonstrative evidence.  JAMES W. McELHANEY, McELHANEY’S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 561 (3d 
ed., 1994). 
29FED. R. EVID. 401 & 403; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 1183; Harvey by 
Harvey v. General Motors Corp, 873 F.2d 1343, 1355 (10th Cir. 1989); Campbell v. Pitt 
County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 (N.C. App. 1987). 
30See infra Part III.A-E. 
31Sandra Sanders, Arizona's Public Records Laws and the Technology Age: Applying 
"Paper" Laws to Computer Records, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 932 (1995). 
32Id.  That computer was called ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator).  
Lee Loevinger, The Invention and Future of the Computer, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 21, 26 (1996).  It had to be manually wired to execute each program as it had no 
storage memory.  Id.  The computer was 15,000 square feet in size, weighed thirty tons, 
contained 6,000 switches and 17,468 vacuum tubes.  Id. 
33Id. at 29.  
34Id. 
35Id.  Transistors took ten years of experimentation and development before they were 
ready for commercial use.  Id. 
36Id. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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transistors as the heart of the computer equipment.37  In the 1980’s, very large scale 
integration (VLSI) increased the density of computer chips.38  By 1995, a single 
computer chip replaced more than five million transistors.39 
The rapid acceleration in the advancement of computer chip technology is the 
heart of the advancement in the use of technology in our modern age.40  Our modern 
use of technology has greatly increased, as the computer chips become faster, lighter, 
smaller, more reliable, less power consuming, and more efficient.41  Where ENIAC 
was used to compute trajectories, computer chips now talk to us in our cars and in 
our pockets.42 
When individuals think of the word “computer,” many envision an electronic 
marvel with magical powers.43  In reality, the capabilities of the computer are quite 
limited, as a computer has no independent intelligence.44  Computers derive most of 
their amazing power from three features: speed, accuracy, and memory.45  The 
accuracy of computers is due partially to the inherent reliability of the electronic 
circuits that make up a computer system.46  The consistency of the computer-
generated results is known as the accuracy of the system.47 
However, computer accuracy only relates to the internal processing of the 
system.  If either the computer instructions or the information fed into the computer 
are inaccurate, the end result of the computer processing will be incorrect.48  This 
phenomenon, known as “Garbage in - Garbage out” (GIGO), is fundamental to 
understanding computer accuracy.49 
                                                                
37Loevinger, supra note 32, at 29. 
38Id. 
39Id. 
40Id. at 30. 
41Id.  Nicolas Negroponte, Professor of Media Technology at MIT wrote: “[c]omputing is 
not about computers any more.  It is about living . . . We have seen computers move out of 
giant airconditioned rooms into closets, then onto desktops, and now into our laps and pockets.  
But this is not the end.”  NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 229, 231 (1995), as quoted 
in  Lee Loevinger, The Invention and Future of the Computer, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 21, 30 (1996).  
42The microprocessor is the foundation of the current American economy, and American 
industry spends more now on computers and related equipment than on all other capital 
equipment combined.  Loevinger, supra note 32, at 33. 
43STEVEN L. MANDELL, COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING:  CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 
6 (1979).  
44Id. 
45Id. at 6.  Computer speeds are measured in nanoseconds, or one-billionth of a second.  
Id.  
46Id. at 7. 
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Computer simulation can take several forms.  The first form is known as 
computer animation.  Computer animation is very similar to commercial animation, 
in that an artistic image is altered frame by frame in order to show actual 
movement.50  The artistic computer rendering is then recorded in rapid succession 
onto a videotape to create the illusion of movement.51  Computer animation is 
produced by collecting all information possible, loading it into the computer system, 
deciding on the animation features of the presentation, rendering the still frames, and 
finally recording the still frames onto videotape.52  It is important to note that 
computer animations are strictly artists’ renditions, and are not limited by any 
physical laws.53 
By contrast, computer reconstructions, also known as computer simulations,54 are 
computer animations grounded in the laws of physics and science.55  To produce a 
reconstruction, the initial step begins with the inputting of the three-dimensional 
coordinates of the objects that were present at the scene.56  Then the motions of each 
object involved in the incident are calculated.57  The laws of science provide the rules 
by which the objects move, and this movement is compared with the testimony and 
observances of eyewitnesses.58  The computerized results can then be recorded on 
videotape for production during the trial.59 
There are several situations in which the use of computer simulations can be very 
valuable.  First, the computer simulation can be valuable if the visualization of the 
event or an object is complicated by the dynamics of the situation.60  Second, if “real-
                                                                
50Berkoff, supra note 7, at 830. 
51Jennifer Robinson Boyle, State v. Pierce: Will Florida Courts Ride the Wave of the 
Future and Allow Computer Animations in Criminal Trials, 9 NOVA L. REV. 371, 375 (1994).  
This is similar to how Saturday morning cartoon favorites are produced.  Using Computer 
Animation in the Courtroom, PROSECUTOR, October 1995, at 19. 
52Boyle, supra note 51, at 375-76. 
53Using Computer Animation, supra note 51, at 20. 
54It is important to note that commentators and courts use some terms interchangeably.  
Therefore, when faced with computer produced evidence, it is important to ascertain the true 
basis for the computer production.  See infra Part III.A and D. 
55Using Computer Animation, supra note 51, at 20. 
56Berkoff, supra note 7, at 831. 
57Id. 
58Id. 
59Id.  In some jurisdictions, the attorneys can now take the computers into the courtroom 
and using an overhead projector, “play” the computer reconstruction for the jury. 
Virtual reality could be considered another type of computer simulation.  It is similar to 
computer reconstructions; however, the viewer (juror) wears a helmet and possibly other 
items, and can individually “see,” “sense,” and investigate the incident scene.  Due to the 
special evidentiary issues which arise with active juror participation, virtual reality will not be 
included in the scope of this comment.  See generally Mary C. Kelly & Jack N. Bernstein, 
Virtual Reality: The Reality of Getting It Admitted, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
145 (1994).  
60Berkoff, supra note 7, at 832. 
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time” of the incident is a crucial factor, the computer simulation can be most 
helpful.61  Third, the computer simulation can recreate an event where physical 
recreation would be impracticable due to expense or danger.62  A computer 
simulation can be very valuable to explain or clarify a complex situation being 
explained by an expert to the jury.63  Finally, computer simulation is able to show 
multiple, three-dimensional views of the incident.64 
One of the most significant cases laying the groundwork for the admissibility of 
computer simulations is Perma Research and Development v. Singer Co.65  Here, 
Perma had assigned a patent to Singer to perfect, manufacture, and market an anti-
skid braking device for automobiles.66  Perma brought action against Singer for a 
breach of a contractual obligation to use its best efforts in fulfillment of the 
contract.67  Singer defended on the grounds that the device was not perfectible.68  
Perma was permitted to present expert testimony with computer simulations 
indicating that the anti-skid device was perfectible.69  The end result was an award of 
nearly seven million dollars in damages for Perma.70 
Another famous civil action using demonstrative computer simulation was a 
massive hexane explosion in the Louisville, Kentucky sewer system.71  A chemical 
engineer had determined that liability ran to the Ralston Purina plant; the problem 
was that it took the engineer “days to explain his theory.”72  The expert’s conclusions 
were reduced to a 12-minute segment of computer animation.73  Immediately after 
viewing the videotape, Ralston Purina settled for more than $65 million.74 
Other types of civil cases have jumped onto the computer simulation bandwagon.  
Those types of cases include medical malpractice,75 fraud,76 auto accident,77 product 





65542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976).  See also Elaine M. Chaney, Computer Simulations: How 
They Can Be Used At Trial and The Arguments for Admissibility, 19 IND. L. REV. 735, 736 
(1986). 





71Mark Barrish, Disclosure of Computer Re-Enactments During Pretrial Discovery, 16 




75For detailed discussion, see Andre M. Thapedi, A.D.A.M. - The Computer Generated 
Cadaver: A New Development in Medical Malpractice and Personal Injury Litigation, 13 J. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss3/7
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liability,78 and nuclear plant accidents.79  Additionally, quasi-civil actions have also 
involved the use of computer simulation.80 
Due to constitutional considerations, demonstrative computer simulations used 
during criminal trials developed at a slower, more cautious rate.  In 1984, a New 
York court became the first court to allow the introductions of a computer animation 
in a criminal trial.81  Courts across the country were slow to allow for the 
introduction of the demonstrative computer evidence.  In 1992, California permitted 
a computer simulation to be used in a murder prosecution.82  In 1995, an Ohio court 
                                                          
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 313 (1995).  A.D.A.M. is a “computer generated cadaver 
that permits the user to peel away several layers of the human body.”  Id. 
76In Delzer v. United Bank of Bismarck, 559 N.W.2d 531 (N.D. 1997), the Delzers brought 
action against the bank for deceit and breach of contract to loan money.  Id. at 532.  Plaintiff’s 
experts used a computer model to explain their theory of what would have happened if the 
Bank had loaned the money it had promised.  Id. at 537.  
77Sallis v. Lamansky, 420 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1988).  
78Arnold v. Riddell, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 979 (D. Kansas  1995).  The Arnolds are the 
parents of a high school football player who suffered a severe neck injury.  Id. at 986.  They 
brought suit against the defendant manufacturer of the football helmet.  Id.  
79Arising out of the infamous incident known as Three Mile Island, In re TMI Litigation 
Consolidated Proceedings, 927 F. Supp. 834 (M.D. Pa. 1996). 
80State v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (antitrust).  See 
also Robert J. Gross, Ten Practice Tips for Dealing with the U.S. Government in Aviation Tort 
Litigation, 12 FALL AIR & SPACE LAW 1 (1997); Dwight H. Merriam, Dealing with Citizen 
Opposition: A Dozen Do's and Don'ts for Development Denizens, SC10 ALI-ABA 517 (1997) 
(land use planning, regulation, and litigation); Robert H. Lande, From the Surrogates to 
Stories, The Evolution of Federal Merger Policy, 11 SPG ANTITRUST (1997); Mark W. 
Frankena & John R. Morris, Why Applicants Should Use Computer Simulation Models to 
Comply with the FERC’S New Merger Policy, 135 No. 3 PUB. UTIL. FORT 22 (1997). 
81People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. 1984).  McHugh involved a vehicular 
homicide, and the animation depicted the motion of a car, not of a person.  Id.  The defendant 
was charged with both intoxication and speeding.  However, the defendant denied both, 
claiming that the accident occurred when bad weather forced his car to swerve off the road and 
hit a road hazard.  Id.  The defendant attempted to demonstrate his theory by computer 
animation.  Id. After discussion, the court concluded that the computer animation was 
admissible, that it was not scientific evidence, but analogous to a simple chart or diagram.  Id. 
at 722.  In an oft-quoted remark, the court stated: 
A computer is not a gimmick and the court should not be shy about its use, when 
proper.  Computers are simply mechanical tools - receiving information and acting on 
instructions at lightning speed.  When the results are useful, they should be accepted, 
when confusing, they should be rejected.  What is important is that the presentation be 
relevant to a possible defense, that it fairly and accurately reflect the oral testimony 
offered and that it be an aid to the jury’s understanding of the issue. 
McHugh, 476 N.Y.S. 2d at 722-23. 
82People v. Mitchell, Marin County Superior Court No. SC-12462-A (Cal. App. First Dist. 
Div. 2 1994).  James Mitchell claimed he shot his brother Artie in self-defense.  The 
prosecution used animated reconstruction of the events based on physical evidence gathered at 
the crime scene.  Id. at 11. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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permitted the use of computer reconstruction to disprove the defendant’s theory of 
the murder case.83 
A most recent use of computer reconstruction occurred in the case of Pierce v. 
State.84  Using computer reconstruction, Pierce was convicted of vehicular homicide 
and sentenced to sixty years.85  Defense counsel objected to the prosecution’s use of 
a three-minute computer reconstruction of the accident, and appealed.86  The 
appellate court, quoting McHugh, permitted the use of the computer simulation, as 
long as counsel “established proper ground work and qualified the expert.”87 
III.  ISSUES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  The Attorneys 
As with the growth and advancement of technology, computer simulations to 
demonstrate expert testimony will continue to be an increasingly common sight in 
courtrooms.  In the mid-1980’s, a typical computer reconstruction cost $100,000 or 
more.88  In 1989, the same simulation cost about $30,000 to $60,000 to produce.89  In 
1993, the cost for the same simulation was $4,000 to $8,000.90 
As with any critical part of the litigation process, the attorney would be well 
advised to consider the local jurisdictional nuances and rules regarding the use of 
computer simulation.91  Time investment prior to the trial is preferable to the “risk of 
incurring the [c]ourt’s wrath and having one’s carefully planned high tech show 
derailed.”92 
                                                                
83State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).  Clark claimed that the death was 
an accident, but the computer reconstruction showed differently.  Id. at 810.  See Kristin L. 
Fulcher, The Jury as Witness: Forensic Computer Animation Transports Jurors to the Scene of 
the Crime or Automobile Accident, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 55 (1996). But see Cornell v. State, 
463 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. 1995) (defendant not permitted to introduce a reconstruction of a crime 
scene as evidence, as lacking adequate foundation). 
84Pierce v. State, 671 So.2d 186 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1996). 
85Id. at 187.  Pierce hit three children with his truck, killing one of them.  Id. 
86Id. 
87Id. at 190.  For a detailed discussion of Pierce, see Jennifer Robinson Boyle, State v. 
Pierce: Will Florida Courts Ride the Wave of the Future and Allow Computer Animations in 
Criminal Trials?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 371 (1994). 
88Daniel Tynan, Evidence in Motion, 13-Oct CAL LAW 85, 85 (1993). 
89Id. 
90Id. A review of any litigation based publication will include advertisements for computer 
software which will produce computer simulations for the attorney.  
91MAUET, supra note 8, at 167.  
92David Siegel & Brian Pass, High Technology at Trial: Use It or Lose It, 444 PLI/LIT 
605, 624 (1992).  The contra is also possible . . . not preparing a computer simulation upon the 
false assumption that the court would exclude it. 
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An effective attorney will have an understanding of data processing and 
computer modeling concepts.93  This will allow the attorney to make an initial 
investigation and develop an understanding of the true materiality of the computer 
simulation.94  “Where the computer is involved, the advocate’s ability to effectively 
detect and present facts and to control the uncertainty associated with those facts will 
depend . . . on his understanding of the data processing environment.”95 
Only a knowledgeable advocate will be able to make effective use of “the oldest 
and most venerable tradition available to the attorney, the art of cross-examining the 
expert.”96  The modeling expert must be made to “defend the procedures used in all 
steps of the modeling process.”97  Using effective cross-examination, the 
knowledgeable advocate can convey to both the judge and jury the unreliability of a 
poorly executed demonstrative computer simulation.98  If the model is speculative, 
the effective and knowledgeable advocate can reveal this substantial defect to the 
factfinder.99  If the computer simulation’s underpinnings are weak, the advocate can 
reveal this to the jury by thoroughly questioning the expert, stripping him of his 
expert “jargon” and requiring him to answer the cross-examination in explicit 
terms.100 
In criminal trials, the U.S. Constitution guarantees the criminal defendant the 
right to effective assistance of counsel.101  In Strickland v. Washington,102 the 
Supreme Court adopted a two-prong test103 which evaluates counsel’s performance 
against the actions of an objective reasonably competent lawyer under the 
circumstances based upon the prevailing professional norms and circumstances.104  
Although this standard applies both during discovery and at trial, currently no case 
                                                                
93Craig Murphy, Computer Simulations and Video Re-Enactments: Fact, Fantasy and 
Admission Standards, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 145, 158 (1990).  This is especially significant 
considering that many advocates have a non-scientific or technical background.  One 
commentator predicts that we may well be headed towards a stratified society—one class of 
sophisticated technological aristocrats, who are able to use and command the complex 
technologies, and a “much larger class of plebeians who still have trouble programming their 
VCRs.”  Loevinger, supra note 32, at 35-36. 
94Id. 
95Id. 
96Itzchak E. Kornfeld, A Postscript on Groundwater Modelling: Daubert, “Good 
Grounds,” and the Central Role of Cross-Examination, 29 TORT. & INS. L. J. 646, 648 (1994). 
97Id. 
98Id. 
99Id. at 648-49. 
100Id. 
101U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
102466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
103The defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the 
deficient performance was so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial that reached a 
reliable result.  Id. 
104Id.  
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has found that that defense counsel’s failure to seek discovery of computerized 
information resulted in a constitutional violation.105  However, as defense attorneys 
and the judiciary become more technically literate and request this information 
during discovery and/or trial, the prevailing norms considered under a Strickland test 
will shift to include computer simulation information.106  Thus, even the minimally 
competent attorney will be required to consider and evaluate demonstrative computer 
simulations.107 
B.  The Experts Themselves 
Prior to evaluating the admissibility of the demonstrative computer simulation, 
the court evaluates the admissibility of the expert’s testimony.108  If the expert 
testimony is inadmissible, then the computer simulation which would demonstrate 
the expert’s opinion would also be inadmissible.109  However, even if the expert 
testimony is admissible, prior to its viewing by the jury the demonstrative computer 
simulation must receive independent scrutiny.110 
In addition to the substantive expert, the demonstrative computer simulation may 
require the testimony of the expert who actually produced the simulation.111  The 
computer expert would still have to be qualified concerning his expertise in the 
subject matter of his testimony.  The testimony of the computer expert should cover:  
1) the expert’s knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in programming 
and operating computers;112 2) the instructions the expert received for creating the 
program;113 3) the data the expert entered into the computer, the source for such data, 
and validation performed on the information;114 4) the steps taken to ensure that the 
                                                                
105Robert Garcia, “Garbage In, Gospel Out”: Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability, 
and The Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1141 (1991). 
106Id. at 1142. 
107Id. 
108FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
109Edward A. Hannon, Computer-Generated Evidence: Testing the Envelope, 63 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 353, 359-60 (1996).  Therefore, qualification of the expert is a critical step, and 
would be performed according to FED. R. EVID. 702.  Depending on the type of testimony the 
expert is expected to produce and the jurisdictional rules that apply, either the Frye, Daubert, 
or combination (Williams/Downing) test would be used.   
110Hannon, supra note 109, at 259-60.  See infra Part III.D for a detailed discussion 
regarding the foundational requirements for admissibility of the demonstrative computer 
simulation. 
111Robert M. Pozin, Sophisticated Models and In-Court Demonstrations, 15 SPG BRIEF 
43, 45 (1986).  If the substantive expert relied on commercially available and tested software, 
in some jurisdictions the computer expert’s testimony may be partially replaced by judicial 
notice.  Id.  Some courts may also considering appointing their own expert under FED. R. 
EVID. 706 to independently evaluate the demonstrative computer simulation. 
112Id. 
113Id. 
114Id.  See infra Part III.C.  
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programs were reliable and performed calculations accurately;115 5) the “chain of 
custody” of all parts of the demonstrative computer simulation;116 6) the reliability of 
the software and hardware;117 and 7) emphasis that the computer is simply making 
quick and speedy mathematical calculations based on the information relayed by 
other parties.118 
Finally, even though the substantive expert may not have personally prepared the 
simulation, the substantive expert must still be familiar with the workings, concepts 
and information used in the demonstrative computer simulation, and be prepared to 
explain them in understandable terms to both the bench and jury.119  If the 
substantive expert has not been properly prepared on these concepts, the advocate 
risks the inadmissibility of the demonstrative computer simulation.120  The 
substantive expert would be unable to testify if the demonstrative computer 
simulation would “fairly and accurately” represent his testimony, and if the computer 
simulation would “assist the expert is testifying.”121 
C.  GIGO - Garbage in, Garbage Out 
Computer systems do not think on their own; they simply respond to the 
instruction and information given by humans.122  If this information and/or 
instruction is faulty, the end result of any computer process would be inaccurate.123  
For example, on January 15, 1990, the AT&T long-distance network collapsed for a 
nine hour period, due to a faulty instruction given to the computer by a person.124  If 
an incorrect computer instruction can create this type of chaos, how much damage 
can an undetected incorrect computer instruction do in the criminal courtroom? 
Reliability of the demonstrative computer simulation is required for 
admissibility.125  Several factors determine the reliability of the simulation:  1) the 
                                                                
115Id.  James T. Wentzel, the crime scene reconstructionist for the Cuyahoga County 
Coroner’s Office in Clark, now calibrates his hardware and software as a validation of 
reliability.  Public Interview with James T. Wentzel (Feb. 4, 1998).  
116Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 54-55.  Testimony would be proper regarding who 
has had access to either the source data, computer software or hardware, and results of the 
simulation. 
117Id.  
118Id. Therefore, the computer simulation is simply demonstrating the testimony of the 
substantive expert witness. 
119David Weinberg, Animation in the Court: Scientific Evidence or Mickey Mouse?, 34 
No. 2 JUDGES’ J. 11, 13 (1995). 
120In re Chartiers Valley School District, 447 A.2d 317 (Pa. 1982). 
121See supra, note 28, for discussion on the “magic words.” 
122See supra, notes 48-49 and accompanying text for discussion regarding GIGO. 
123Mario Borelli, The Computer as Advocate: An Approach to Computer-Generated 
Display in the Courtroom, 71 IND. L. J. 439, 450-51 (1996). 
124Garcia, supra note 105, at 1077. 
125See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) for the Supreme Court’s most recent 
discussion regarding reliability of evidence. 
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hardware (equipment);126 2) the software (instructions);127 3) the manner in which the 
information was entered into the computer;128 4) the presence or absence of quality 
control over the process;129 and 5) the presence or absence of a security system 
within the computer.130 
Based on the GIGO principle, a knowledgeable attorney could challenge the 
reliability of the demonstrative computer simulation.  Even commercial software is 
subject to inaccuracies, so all portions of the production of the computer simulation 
should be considered.131  However, the qualification of the input data is both the most 
important and the most vulnerable.132  An effective attorney will be wise to double-
check each piece of information input into the simulation software.133  Spot-checks 
should be performed on the output of the process to verify and validate the entire 
process.134 
Additionally, the theories used to process and formulate the computer simulation 
require close scrutiny.135  The computer programs require large amounts of source 
information to produce an accurate simulation.136  If inadequate information is 
available, extrapolation or speculation of the information may be performed to 
produce the data necessary to run the program.137  However, such information is not 
factual; rather, it is an educated guess, and will distort the actual event.138 
                                                                
126Dennis A. Estis et al., Admissibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, CONSTRUCTION 
LAW, August 1994, at 42. 
127Id. 
128Id.  For example, in an accident reconstruction scenario, information would need to be 
gathered, entered, and verified from eyewitnesses, photographs, scene visits, highway maps, 
and topographical surveys.  Kristin L. Fulcher, The Jury As Witness: Forensic Computer 
Animation Transports Jurors to the Scene of a Crime or Automobile Accident, 22 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 55, 74 (1996).  If just one piece of this information is inaccurate, it can skew the entire 
results of the demonstrative computer simulation . . . resulting in an inaccurate video display 
of the incident to the jury.  Id. 
129Estis et al., supra note 126, at 42. 
130Id. 
131Id. 
132David W. Muir, Debunking the Myths About Computer Animation, 444 PLI/LIT591, 
602 (1992). 
133Id.  The dissent in Clark noted that the crime scene reconstructionist did not validate the 
information given to him, that “he neither visited this crime scene nor personally took any of 
the measurements used in the analysis.”  State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d  795, 818 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1995). 
134Muir, supra note 132, at 602.  This source contains a good, detailed explanation of 
validating the input data. 
135I. Neel Chatterjee, Admitting Computer Animations: More Caution and New Approach 
are Needed, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 36, 41 (1995). 
136Id. 
137Id. 
138Id. at 41-42. 
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D.  Admissibility  
The admissibility of computer simulations continues to provide confusion for 
both the bench and bar.139  Some view the computer simulation as substantive 
evidence, and subject the simulation to rigorous substantive admissibility 
requirements.140  Others view the computer simulation as demonstrative evidence, 
and subject the evidence to the more relaxed admissibility requirements for 
demonstrative evidence.141 
First, to admit demonstrative computer simulation to illustrate expert testimony, 
the experts themselves must be qualified to testify.142  Under Federal Rules of 
                                                                
139MAUET, supra note 8, at 165-67.  A review of the current literature also shows 
continuing confusion over the true role of computer simulation.  Due to this confusion, the 
wise litigator will be aware of the issues and arguments concerning both substantive and 
demonstrative computer simulations. 
140As substantive evidence, the computer simulation is admitted as an exhibit, the 
attorneys can use it during closing arguments, and the jury can use it during deliberations.  Id. 
For substantive evidence, the computer simulation itself must have independent probative 
value, add new facts to the case, and meet substantive evidentiary standards.  Chatterjee, supra 
note 135, at 38.  As such, the computer simulation itself is subjected to the requirements of 
FED. R. EVID. 702, and would come under the jurisdictional scrutiny of the Frye/Daubert type 
evaluation.  Id.  In one case, the computer simulation was offered for substantive evidence, but 
failed a Daubert evaluation.  Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083 (10th 
Cir. 1994).  However, the court still permitted the simulation to be introduced as illustrative 
evidence.  Id. at 1086-91.  For additional information regarding the use of computer 
simulations as substantive evidence, see I. Neel Chatterjee, Admitting Computer Animations: 
More Caution and New Approach are Needed, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 36 (1995); Edward A. 
Hannon, Computer-Generated Evidence: Testing the Envelope, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 353 (1996); 
John Selbak, Digital Litigation: The Prejudicial Effects of Computer-Generated Animation in 
the Courtroom, 9 HIGH TECH. L. J. 337 (1994). 
141As computers have no independent thought process and totally reflect the thought of 
humans, it is more proper to use the computer simulation as demonstrative evidence.  
Demonstrative evidence is not admitted into evidence, and is usually not permitted in the 
deliberation room.  See supra, Part II.A.  However, by illustrating the expert’s testimony with 
computer simulation, the visual conceptualization of the expert’s testimony is shown to the 
jury, and carried mentally by the jury themselves back into the deliberation room.  
142See supra, Part III.B.  As previously mentioned, the Federal Rules of Evidence are used 
throughout this practitioner's guide. However, even for those jurisdictions which have not 
adopted the Federal Rules, the discussions contained here are valuable in handling 
demonstrative computer evidence.  
The Federal Rules of Evidence echo the Daubert standard, based upon Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which concluded that the judge serves as 
gatekeeper for the admissibility of scientific testimony, relevancy being based upon not 
whether or not the judge favored or disfavored the scientific conclusion, but rather if there are 
good grounds for the scientific conclusion, the testimony is admissible, and the jury is to 
determine the weight and credibility of the scientific testimony.  Id. at 592, 597.  Daubert 
contains the "four horsemen," that is, four factors which judges can consider in determining 
the reliability and hence the admissibility of the proffered scientific evidence: 1) whether the 
theory employed by the expert is generally accepted in the scientific community; 2) whether 
the theory has been subjected to peer review activities and publication; 3) whether the theory 
can be and has been tested; and 4) whether the known or potential error rate of the tests is 
acceptable. The expert's bare conclusions, without more, are not enough; rather, the expert's 
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Evidence 702, the expert’s opinions may be scrutinized for reliability and relevancy, 
using a Daubert test for scientific testimony. The Federal Rules of Evidence 401/403 
relevancy/balancing tests work together with the Daubert test contained in 702 to 
insure the quality of the evidence placed before the jury. 
The purpose of demonstrative computer simulation is simply to make an expert’s 
testimony more understandable, or to provide background material to accomplish the 
same effect.143  Therefore, to admit the demonstrative simulation, the only required 
foundation is the expert’s testimony that the animation fairly and accurately 
illustrates the expert’s opinion and is helpful for the expert to explain the testimony 
to the jury.144 
To authenticate the demonstrative simulation, both the source information and 
the computer process used to create the simulation are subject to scrutiny for 
reliability.145  As discussed earlier, both the substantive expert and the computer 
expert will need to demonstrate the reliability of the underlying data, formulae or 
theories, etc.146  Additionally, the system should be authenticated to show accurate 
results, and reliability of the processes.147  Once this foundational requirement is met, 
the demonstrative computer simulation can be considered to illustrate the expert’s 
testimony. 
The importance of establishing the reliability of both the underlying data and 
theories, as well as the operation of the computer system, can not be taken lightly.  
For evidence to be placed before the jury, reliability of the evidence is required.  A 
criminal defendant may counter that his constitutionally protected Fifth 
Amendment148 due process right to mount his own defense will permit the use of 
evidence which may seem reliable in the lay setting, but has not been deemed 
reliable de jure.  However, in a recent Supreme Court decision,149 the Court held that 
                                                          
conclusions must be founded on sound science, requiring objective, independent evaluation of 
the expert's work.  Id. at 593-97. 
Prior to the Daubert standard, the Federal Rules were based on the Frye standard, named 
aptly for Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923). Some state jurisdictions still 
utilize the Frye standard, which held that evidence which was not based on generally accepted 
principles in the scientific community was inadmissible, therefore not permitting the 
admission of new or novel scientific theories.  Id. at 1014. 
143Hannan, supra note 109, at 360. 
144MAUET, supra note 8, at 166.  In People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. 1984), 
(discussed supra, note 80), the court articulated that the demonstrative computer simulation 
was admittable upon qualification of the expert if the computer simulation:  1) was relevant, 2) 
fairly and accurately reflected the oral testimony, and 3) could aid the jury in understanding 
the testimony.  Id. at 722. 
145Weinberg, supra note 119, at 12. 
146See supra, Part III.B. 
147Weinberg, supra note 119, at 13.  FED. R. EVID. 901 will permit authentication by 
showing the computer produces accurate results, by demonstrating that commercially 
available equipment and software was used, or by judicial notice.  Id.  For sample foundational 
questions specifically developed for computer simulations, see Gail Donoghue, Computer 
Generated Exhibits, 553 PLI/LIT 509, 524-25 (1996). 
148U.S. CONST. amend V. 
149United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) . 
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the criminal defendant must establish reliability of his defense evidence, and that 
unreliable evidence has no place before a jury in the criminal courtroom.150  
Therefore, the establishment of the reliability of demonstrative computer simulation 
to illustrate expert testimony is a crucial phase, and should be give full and proper 
weight in preparation for trial. 
E.  Additional Evidentiary Issues 
1.  Discovery 
An expert’s testimony illustrated by computer simulation will contain many 
complex data, theories, and calculations, and take considerable time by the 
opposition to study and prepare.151  However, all that is required under criminal 
discovery rules is the pre-trial disclosure of a summary of the expert’s intended 
testimony.152  The civil discovery rules are more liberal, requiring the disclosure of 
“data or other information considered by the witness”153 and notification of any 
“exhibits to be used as a summary.”154  Neither rule explicitly requires advance 
notification and production of the computer simulation, or its chief components. 
In the civil context, early case law did not require opposing counsel to supply the 
underlying data and theorems of the computer simulation in advance of trial.155  
However, subsequent cases have required the timely pre-trial disclosure of 
information regarding the use of demonstrative computer simulation to illustrate 
expert testimony, and have excluded the expert’s testimony when timely pre-trial 
disclosure was not given.156 
Beyond the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protection of Rule 26, civil litigants 
may also be able to obtain access to the computer simulation information through 
                                                                
150Id. 
151Barrish, supra note 71, at 712.  
152FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a) (1) (E).  The rule requires the defendant to comply with a 
reciprocal request by the government after the government has provided the defense with the 
defendant’s discovery request.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (b) (1). 
153FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (a) (2) (B). 
154Id. 
155Perma Research v. Singer Company, 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976).  Although Perma 
refused to disclose the details to Singer, the trial judge still allowed the expert to testify.  The 
appellate court did not find an abuse of discretion by the trial judge, as “Singer has not shown 
that it did not have an adequate basis on which to cross-examine the plaintiff’s experts.”  Id. at 
115. 
156See Mississippi PSC v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 358 So. 2d 418 (Miss. 1978); 
Richardson v. State Highway & Transportation Commission, 863 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1993); 
Ladeburg v. Ray, 508 N.W.2d 694 (Iowa 1993).  In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric 
Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1980), the court concluded that a 
“discovering party not only must be given access to the data that represents the computer’s 
‘work product,’ but he also must see the data put into the computer, the programs used to 
manipulate the data and produce the conclusions, and the theory or logic employed by those 
who planned and executed the experiment.” Id. at 1266-67 (citing 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2218). 
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other avenues.  The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and request for production 
will facilitate the obtainment of this information.157  Very specific interrogatories 
may also lead to additional information. 
The attorney can also use the protective order provided by Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 26(c) to require enough advance notice and information to adequately 
prepare,158 to require that the opposing party’s obligation to supplement discovery 
include any demonstrative computer simulation,159 and to limit disclosure in order to 
protect any proprietary information of the expert.160  Using a motion in limine for a 
pre-trial hearing may be useful in determining the jurisdictional boundaries of this 
disclosure.161 
However, the criminal defendant does not have at his disposal the discovery tools 
available to the civil litigant.  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 allows for limited 
discovery, but it does not allow depositions or interrogatories of the experts who will 
be testifying with the computer simulation.162  The criminal defendant must look to 
the court’s interpretations of the Constitution for his protection.  Under the Due 
Process clause, the government must disclose any information in its possession that 
is favorable to the defense and material to guilt or punishment, including information 
that is exculpatory or that can be used to impeach a witness.163  This would apply 
equally to information regarding a computer simulation.164 
The criminal defendant also has a protected constitutional right to confront his 
accusers.165  Inherent in the right of confrontation is the right to cross-examine the 
witness.166  However, improper pre-trial discovery of the expert’s testimony and the 
accompanying complex computer simulation information would render the cross-
examination of the expert incomplete at best.167  Yet, to date there is no clear, 
brightline rule allowing for the pre-trial discovery of demonstrative computer 
simulations.168 
                                                                
157FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b) (1); FED. R. CIV. P. 33; Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 54. 
158Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 54. 
159Id. 
160Pozin, supra note 111, at 44. 
161Edward V. Filardi & Dimitrios T. Drivas, The Presentation of Demonstrative and 
Visual Evidence At Trial, 299 PLI/PAT 245, 250 (1990).  The attorney may also start with the 
voir dire challenge of the opposing expert . . . remember, no expert, no demonstrative 
computer simulation.  Id.  
162Edward J. Bardelli, The Use of Computer Simulations in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 
WAYNE L. REV. 1357, 1374-75 (1994). 
163Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
164Garcia, supra note 105, at 1132. 
165U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
166Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 66 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
167Garcia, supra note 105, at 1137-38. 
168The issue in Ritchie was: Does the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine entail the 
right to obtain discovery before trial of any and all information in a confidential file that might 
be useful to contradict or to impeach unfavorable testimony at trial, or to prepare for trial?  
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2.  Hearsay 
Upon introduction of demonstrative computer simulation to illustrate expert 
testimony, opposing counsel is likely to stand and welcome the simulation with that 
aggravating phrase: “Objection, hearsay.”  However, a demonstrative computer 
simulation is not hearsay, it is not an out of court statement offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted.169  Rather, demonstrative computer simulation is offered to 
illustrate the expert’s testimony; to assist the expert in the explanation and 
clarification of his testimony to the jury.170  Since the computer simulation 
demonstrates the expert’s testimony, the expert’s in-court statements are those 
statements which are evaluated against the hearsay rules.171 
In those jurisdictions which may still classify demonstrative computer simulation 
as substantive evidence, Federal Rules of Evidence 803 (24) and 804 (b) (5) may 
provide relief to the hearsay objection.  These hearsay “catchall exceptions” give 
courts discretionary authority to admit hearsay evidence, providing the court 
determines that the evidence is reliable and trustworthy.172  However, the caveat is 
that these exceptions require pre-trial notification to the opposing party.173 
3.  The 403 Balancing Test: Unfairly Prejudicial or Technology Backlash? 
As this discussion is entitled “Seeing is Believing,”174 this old adage gains extra 
weight when considering computer simulations that are produced for the jury.175  
Computerization carries with it a public perception of precision and infallibility.176  
The fear by opposing counsel is that the jury will think “I saw it on TV, so it must be 
true,” without examining the validity of the expert’s own underlying testimony.177 
Under Federal Rules of Evidence 403, the court can exclude evidence, regardless 
of its authentication and relevance, “if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”178  
Generally courts will admit demonstrative computer simulation if the simulation is 
                                                          
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 42-43.  The plurality decision held that the Sixth Amendment does not 
guarantee the right of pre-trial discovery.  Id. at 61. 
169FED. R. EVID. 801. 
170Borelli, supra note 123, at 448. 
171Additionally, FED. R. EVID. 703 allows an expert to rely upon information not in 
evidence in forming his testimonial opinion. 
172Marc A. Ellenbrogen, Lights, Camera, Action: Computer-Animated Evidence Gets Its 
Day in Court, 34 B.C. L. REV. 1087, 1110-11 (1993).  
173See supra, Part III.E(1) for discussion on pre-trial discovery. 
174Racz v. R.T Merryman Trucking, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 4, 1994). 
175
 Borelli, supra note 123, at 455. 
176Id. 
177Murphy, supra note 93, at 158.  The expert in Pierce described the effect as this: “All 
eyes were glued to the” computer simulation.  Fulcher, supra note 128, at 72. 
178FED. R. EVID. 403.  To preserve the record for appeal, the simulation needs to be 
included in the record.  
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true to the expert’s testimony,179 is not unnecessarily inflammatory,180 and proper 
pretrial notice has been forewarned to the opposition.  The court places great faith in 
the jury and their ability to adhere to the court’s instructions.181 
However, there have been instances where courts have disallowed the use of 
demonstrative computer simulation, citing the prejudicial effect foreseen by Federal 
Rules of Evidence 403.  It would be possible to boast the credibility of an expert’s 
not-quite-firmly-grounded testimony by the mere method of using a demonstrative 
computer simulation.  Coupled with less knowledgeable opposing counsel, the 
prejudicial effect can quickly outweigh the probative value of the expert’s testimony.  
In one instance, the simulation was so effective that it made the judge uncomfortable, 
and he was convinced that the simulation would remove from the jury the factfinding 
role.182  In another case, the court determined that the computer simulation was not 
sufficiently similar to the expert’s testimony to permit the simulation to be shown to 
the jury.183  However, another court disapprovingly found that even though the 
computer simulation was an adequate representation of the expert’s testimony, 
counsel gave opposing counsel inadequate notice and time to prepare for 
examination of the simulation.184  In each of these instances, Federal Rules of 
Evidence 403 was cited as the authority to exclude the proposed demonstrative 
computer simulation to illustrate the expert’s testimony. 
The backlash in our society against over computerization can also lurk as a 
potentially damaging prejudice on the contra side of the demonstrative computer 
simulation.185  The use of the demonstrative computer simulation is supposed to aid 
the jury in clarifying the expert’s complex testimony.  However, in some instances, 
other types of demonstrative evidence would be much more helpful to the jury in 
                                                                
179In Robinson v. Missiori Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 1984), the Tenth 
Circuit ruled that in this matter with the limited illustrative use of computer simulation, there 
is no resulting prejudice; provided that there is a cautionary instruction to the jury and an 
opportunity for cross-examination of the expert.  Evidence - Videotaped Animation - 
Illustration of Expert’s Theory, 95 No. 5 FED. LITIGATOR 43 (1994).  
180In Pierce v. State, 671 So.2d 186 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1996), even though the evidence 
indicated a bloody scene with screaming children, the “computer animation videotape 
demonstrated no blood and replicated no sound.  Further, the mannequins used in the 
computer animation . . . depicted no facial expressions.”  Florida Appeals Court OK’s Use of 
Computer Animation As Demonstrative Evidence in Criminal Trials, 1996 WL 259109.  In 
Clark, the demonstrative computer simulation indicated the defendant and victim by the use of 
stick figures.  State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
181
 Hannon, supra note 109, at 358.  One commentator concurs with the dissenting judge 
in Perma, that most people have had enough experience with computer glitches and errors as 
to be skeptical when presented with computer produced information.  Borelli, supra note 123, 
at 455. 
182Computer Simulation May Be Considered Real Evidence, 29 Dec. PROSECUTOR 17, 21 
(1995). 
183Sommervold v. Grevlos, 518 N.W.2d 733, 738 (S.D. 1994). 
184Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 863 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1993). 
185James W. McElhaney, Gizmos in the Courtroom: Don’t Use Technology at Trial Just 
Because You Can, A.B.A. J. Nov. 1997, 74, 75. 
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understanding the expert’s testimony.186  Where more simplified demonstrative 
evidence is required, the excess use of computer simulation just for the sake of the 
new technology187 can dilute the jury’s understanding of the expert testimony.188 
Even when the technology is the proper media for the demonstrative illustration, 
the jury can negatively react to the computer simulation.  Jurors can be skeptical as 
to lawyer-created evidence189 and may view a computer simulation in a skewed 
light.190  One instance revealed that a jury recognized an intentional effort of an 
emotional appeal191 and became angry with counsel for this intentional effort to bias 
their verdict.192 
4.  Jury Instructions 
The court can address the concerns of the parties by giving specific limiting 
instructions.193  For effectiveness, the judge should instruct the jury when the 
simulation is shown that the it is being used to illustrate the expert testimony.194  
Additional clarification by the judge related to scale, size, and other similarities will 
be helpful to proper use by the jury of the demonstrative computer simulation.195 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
With the rapid growth of technology, an increased use of demonstrative computer 
simulation to illustrate expert testimony in the courtroom is expected.  The expert's 
testimony is required for introduction of the demonstrative computer simulation 
before the jury.196 
                                                                
186In one example, an attorney was cross-examining a doctor regarding lung cancer 
metastasization.  Id.  Rather than use the whiz-bang technology, the attorney had the doctor 
hold up a grapefruit (representing the tumor) right next to his chest.  Id.  The grapefruit was 
covered with Post-It notes, which represented the migrating cancer cells.  Id.  During the 
cross-examination, the attorney pulled the Post-It notes off of the grapefruit, and stuck them 
all over the doctor . . . demonstrating the migration of the cancer.  Id.  
187In the technology world, this overuse of technology just for the sake of the technology 
is known as “latest and greatest” or “bleeding edge;” the point being that the mere use of the 
brand-new, hot-out-of-the-development-lab technology is more important than the intended 
result itself. 
188McElhaney, supra note 185, at 75. 
189Id.  Criminal defense attorney Gerald Messerman worries that the high costs of the 
technology  will make litigation increasingly undemocratic.  Id.  
190Id. 
191Fredrick Lederer, supra note 2, at 42-44.  The graphics in the simulation were encased 
in tombstones.  Id. 
192Id. What really could be more damaging to your case than to anger the jury against you? 
193Fulcher, supra note 128, at 75. 
194Id. 
195Id. 
196See supra, Part III.B. 
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The prepared and tenacious litigator will become knowledgeable regarding the 
terms, concepts, and processes involved in creating the computer simulation,197 as 
demonstrative computer simulation carries additional evidentiary reliability 
concerns.  The “Garbage In, Garbage Out” principle of computing requires that the 
underlying information and process used to produce the computer simulation be 
critically reviewed and evaluated for accuracy and reliability.198  Effective counsel 
should analyze and plan for (and against) the use of demonstrative computer 
simulations, and assist the court in understanding these same technical terms, 
concepts and processes.  Failure of counsel to familiarize themselves with the 
technology which results in the admission of unreliable computer simulations may 
arise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel and ethical concerns. 
Seeing may be believing.199  Effective counsel will ensure that only fair and 
accurate illustrations of the expert’s testimony via demonstrative computer 
simulations reach the jury.  It is the responsibility of the court and counsel to ensure 
the computer simulations which illustrate the expert’s testimony assist the jury in 
their understanding, and do not unfairly prejudice their decision. 
 
                                                                
197See supra, Part III.A. 
198See supra, Part III.C. 
199Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, *5 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994). 
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